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Resisting the power of temptations: the right prefrontal cortex
and self-control
Abstract
Imagine you are overweight and you spot your favorite pastry in the storefront of a bakery. How do you
manage to resist this temptation? Or to give other examples, how do you manage to restrain yourself
from overspending or succumbing to sexual temptations? The present article summarizes two recent
studies stressing the fundamental importance of inhibition in the process of decision making. Based on
the results of these studies, we dare to claim that the capacity to resist temptation depends on the activity
level of the right prefrontal cortex (PFC). 
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Imagine you are overweight and you spot your favorite pastry in the storefront of a 
bakery. How do you manage to resist this temptation? Or to give other examples, how do 
you manage to restrain yourself from overspending or succumbing to sexual temptations?  
The present article summarizes two recent studies stressing the fundamental importance 
of inhibition in the process of decision-making. Based on the results of these studies, we 
dare to claim that the capacity to resist temptation depends on the activity level of the 
right prefrontal cortex. 
 
 2
The siren call of our impulses, desires, and urges often tempts us, and many of our 
decisions involve a conflict between our deliberate and our pleasure-seeking sides. From 
the standpoint of adaptive self-regulation, an appropriate response to temptations 
involves exercising self-control1-3. This conscious control of thought, action, and 
emotions may be considered as a distinctive feature of human cognition. Moreover, the 
ability to override immediate urges is not only relevant for adaptive individual decision-
making but also contributes to harmonious social interactions. For example, suppressing 
a desire to retaliate may be necessary in order to prevent the escalation of interpersonal 
conflict. Thus, our capacity to suppress the unlimited pursuit of immediate self-interest 
has been suggested to be a hallmark of civilized life4.  
A considerable amount of research has shown that the resistance to immediate 
self-interests is often greatly diminished in people with injuries to the prefrontal cortex5-7. 
This seems particularly true for patients with right-sided lesions8-10. However, patient 
studies are sometimes difficult to conduct due to limited opportunities for experimental 
manipulations. In addition, confounding variables, i.e. the possibility of functional re-
organization after brain lesions, may hamper the interpretation of the results, and studies 
often have a low number of patients (see reference11 for limitations of the lesion method). 
Some functional imaging studies suggest that the right prefrontal cortex may be 
particularly critical for self-regulation and self-control12-15 or behavioral adjustments16. 
These studies, however, only passively measure brain activity correlated with a specific 
task, but do not reveal a causal relationship between changes in brain activity and their 
respective behavioral consequences. A direct investigation of such a causal brain-
behavior relationship would require a controlled manipulation of brain activity where the 
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impact on behavior or cognition can be quantified17. The technique of transcranial 
repetitive magnetic stimulation (TMS) allows for such a manipulation by inducing brief 
electric currents within discrete brain areas via pulsed magnetic fields on the 
corresponding scalp location. The “virtual lesion” technique in particular, i.e., low-
frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) over the course of several 
minutes, allows a transient disruption of cortical functions18. We applied this technique to 
examine whether self-control can be modified in healthy individuals in the context of 
both individual and social decision-making. 
 
Individual decision-making: Diminished self-control leads to increased risk-taking 
behavior19 
Adolescents generally exhibit riskier behavior than do adults. Their decision-making 
behavior is also thought to be a manifestation of an immature prefrontal cortex20, and 
patients with traumatic brain injuries or other pathologies affecting the PFC show a 
tendency for riskier, "out-of-character" decision-making, and an apparent disregard for 
negative consequences of their actions21,22. Clinical impressions tell us that this is 
particularly true for patients with right-sided lesions9,10. We designed a “virtual lesion” 
study with healthy volunteers in order to investigate hemispheric asymmetries in risk-
taking behavior directly. We used low-frequency rTMS to disrupt left or right 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) function transiently before applying a well-
known gambling paradigm that provides a measure of risk taking (“Risk Task”)23. In this 
task, subjects have to decide between a relatively safe choice, which provides a low 
reward with a high probability, and a risky choice, which provides a substantially higher 
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reward with a relatively low probability. Subjects were presented with binary choices 
between a safe and a risky choice. If subjects perceive the high reward to be salient, there 
may be a temptation to decide in favor of the risky choice. However, this choice has the 
drawback that the reward is only available with a low probability.  
In the task, a series of six boxes on the screen indicated the probabilities of the 
different outcomes. The boxes can be either pink or blue, and the proportion of blue and 
pink boxes changed from one trial to another (5:1, 4:2, or 3:3; Fig. 1). The subject was 
told that the computer had arbitrarily hidden a “winning token” inside one of the blue or 
pink boxes. The subject had to decide whether the token was hidden in a box by pressing 
a button of the corresponding color.  
 
*** Insert Figure 1 about here *** 
 
Findings were straightforward. Participants stimulated over the right DLPFC (N=9) were 
more likely to choose the high risk prospect than those stimulated over the left DLPFC 
(N=9) or those who received sham stimulation (N=9) (Fig. 2A). We thus demonstrated 
that individuals display a significantly stronger preference for the risky prospect, 
choosing the larger potential reward even at the risk of greater penalty, following 
disruption of the right, but not the left, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. We therefore 
suggest that the “Risk Task” primarily requires suppression of an option that appears 
seductive because of its large reward. That is, subjects are initially attracted to the high 
reward/high risk options by virtue of their higher payoffs, a tendency normally 
suppressed over the course of the task by top-down control mechanisms.  
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At this point we will discuss two alternative possible explanations of the rTMS 
effect which are not considered in the original paper. For a discussion of additional 
alternative explanations, we ask the reader to refer to reference19. The task requires 
subjects to measure the ratio of pink and blue boxes, and to take the various amounts of 
money associated with the different choices into account, in order to calculate the 
expected value of the two options. Moreover, it requires subjects to integrate information 
about the rewarding and punishing consequences of an action. It may thus be that 
subjects receiving right prefrontal rTMS are impaired at calculating the riskiness of the 
choices or at integrating information about the choices’ consequences. However, these 
interpretations are less convincing since repeated measures ANOVA of group (left TMS, 
right TMS, sham) x level of risk (5:1, 4:2) x balance of reward (90:10, 80:20, 70:30, 
60:40) revealed a main effect of balance of reward (P <0.001) and, importantly, no 
interaction between group and balance of reward (P =0.414; see Figure 2B). In other 
words, if subjects were impaired in calculating or integrating the consequences of 
different choices, we should observe that subjects who received right rTMS are unable to 
discriminate between the different balances of reward. In addition, if subjects who 
received rTMS over the right prefrontal cortex were impaired at calculating the riskiness 
of the choice, their deliberation time would probably be longer than that of subjects who 
received rTMS over left prefrontal cortex or subjects who received sham stimulation. 
This was not the case. ANOVA of group x level of risk x balance of reward for the 
decision times revealed no main effect for group (P = 0.737). Therefore we favor the 
hypothesis that the right prefrontal cortex plays a crucial role in the suppression of 
superficially seductive options. We further speculate that the substantial differences 
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among individuals in risk proneness in real-life scenarios may correspond to different 
levels of activity in the right prefrontal cortex. The higher this level is, the lower one's 
"appetite for risk". If this turns out to be true, high frequency rTMS (which increases 
cortical excitability) could be used to increase activity of the right prefrontal cortex in a 
therapeutic framework to enhance cognitive control and adaptive decision-making. 
 
*** Insert Figure 2A and 2B about here *** 
 
The results of this study led us to speculate whether increasing rather than decreasing the 
level of activity in the right prefrontal cortex would diminish, rather than raise, subjects’ 
”appetite for risk”. Indeed, preliminary results show that participants with increased 
activity in the right DLPFC chose the safe prospect more often than did the sham group24. 
 
Social decision-making: Diminished self-control leads to selfish behavior25 
The human species is unique in the extent to which social norms that constrain the 
unrestricted pursuit of self-interest govern behavior. Overcoming the self’s natural, 
impulsive nature requires self-control. The Ultimatum Game (UG) provides a useful tool 
for studying the neural mechanisms of self-control in the context of social decision-
making, as it illustrates the tension between economic self-interest on the one hand and 
fairness goals on the other. In this bargaining game, two anonymous individuals, a 
“proposer” and a “responder”, have to agree on the division of a given amount of money, 
say $10, according to the following rules: The proposer can make exactly one suggestion 
on how the $10 should be allocated among the two by making an integer offer X to the 
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responder. If the responder accepts, each player keeps the amount the proposer allocates. 
If the responder rejects the offer, neither player receives any money. If economic self-
interest alone motivates the responder, he will accept even a very low offer, say $1, 
because $1 is better than $0. However, if concerns for reciprocity26 and equity27 drive 
him, he may reject low offers, because he views them as insultingly unfair and 
inequitable. Thus, the responder faces a conflict in case of low offers between his 
economic self-interest, which drives him towards accepting the offer, and his fairness 
goals, which encourage him to reject it. Strong evidence28,29 suggests that many people 
reject low offers in the game even if the stake level is as high as three months’ income30. 
Rejection rates up to 80% have been observed31 for offers below 25% of the available 
money, and a neuroimaging study32 showed that both the anterior insula – a brain area 
involved in the evaluation and representation of negative emotional states33 – and the 
DLPFC are activated when responders decide whether to accept or reject an unfair offer. 
For our purposes, it is particularly interesting that both the right and left DLPFC are more 
strongly activated when subjects face unfair offers compared to when they face fair 
offers. These areas are widely thought to be involved in executive control, goal 
maintenance, and the inhibition of pre-potent responses34. All these functions are relevant 
for the responder in UG because there are likely to be several competing goals – fairness 
goals and self-interest – and the question is which of them should be maintained, i.e., 
given priority, and which motivational impulse should be restrained. 
The fact that the DLPFC is more strongly active when subjects are confronted with 
an unfair offer compared with a fair offer32 cannot provide conclusive evidence that 
DLPFC activity is crucial for the responders' decisions. In principle, it is even possible 
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that this area is not causally involved in the decision to accept or reject unfair offers. To 
address this question, we applied prefrontal low-frequency rTMS to 52 subjects (left 
DLPFC, N=17; right DLPFC, N=19; sham, N=16) who were in the role of the responder 
in an anonymous UG with a stake size of CHF 20 (CHF 1 ≈ $ 0.80). To generate enough 
observations on the responders’ side, we limited the proposer's strategy space, meaning 
that only offers of CHF 10, 8, 6, or 4 were possible. Obviously CHF 10 is the fairest 
offer, because it splits the stake size equally, while CHF 4 is the most unfair offer.  
If the DLPFC is involved in overriding selfish impulses that drive a subject 
towards acceptance of unfair offers, low-frequency rTMS of this brain region should 
increase the acceptance rate for unfair offers relative to the sham stimulation condition, 
as this kind of stimulation leads to a disruption of neuronal firing in the stimulated brain 
region18. In other words, if we disrupt activity in a brain region that is hypothesized to 
override selfish impulses, we should functionally weaken the inhibitory control and, 
selfish impulses should thus have a stronger impact on decision-making; as a 
consequence, the acceptance rate of unfair offers should increase. We focus on 
acceptance behavior with regard to the lowest offer in this case because the tension 
between fairness and self-interest is greatest here. Figure 3A indicates that the right 
DLPFC group has a significantly higher acceptance rate than the left DLPFC and the 
sham rTMS group. Importantly, these differences across conditions cannot be attributed 
to different fairness judgments across groups. Immediately after the ultimatum game 
experiment, we elicited subjects’ fairness judgments with regard to different offers on a 
7-point scale. Subjects in all three treatment groups judged the lowest offer of 4 as rather 
unfair and there are no differences in fairness judgments across groups (Figure 3B). Thus, 
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despite the fact that subjects in all three groups judge low offers as very unfair, subjects 
whose right DLPFC has been disrupted exhibit much higher acceptance rates. Similar 
results were found for the other unfair offer of 6 CHF.  
*** Insert Figure 3A, 3B about here *** 
 
These results suggest that subjects who received right prefrontal TMS are less 
able to resist the economic temptation to accept unfair offers. Our findings are also 
interesting in the light of evidence suggesting that patients with right prefrontal lesions 
are characterized by the inability to behave in normatively appropriate ways despite the 
fact that they possess the social knowledge that is necessary for normative behavior35. 
Our findings are also congruent with the observation of empathy deficits in patients with 
predominantly right frontal lesions36,37, as an inhibitory component is required to regulate 
and tone down the pre-potent self-perspective to allow the perception and evaluation of 
others’ perspective38. Further support comes from findings in patients with fronto-
temporal dementia (FTD), showing that symptoms may be influenced by the relative 
involvement of the right versus the left hemisphere , with left-sided FTD manifesting 
language changes and right-sided FTD presenting with aggressive, antisocial, and other 
socially undesirable behaviors39. 
Note that if we suggest that right DLPFC is involved in overriding self-interest 
motives, we do not necessarily imply that this brain region directly suppresses other brain 
areas that represent self-interest. Instead, we believe that right DLPFC is involved in top-
down control (or executive control), the overall effect of which is a reduction in the 
weight of self-interested impulses on an individual's action. Thus, rather than directly 
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suppressing neural activities that represent self-interested impulses, the DLPFC may be 
part of a network that modulates the relative impact of fairness motives and self-interest 
goals on decision-making, and the final outcome of this modulation may then be a 
weakening of the impact of self-interest motives on decision-making.  
Evidence from human lesion studies has implicated the right hemisphere in the 
processing of emotional and social information40,41. Can a reduced general emotional 
responsiveness explain the observed rTMS effect after right prefrontal rTMS stimulation? 
This seems to be unlikely for the following reasons: rTMS of the right DLPFC reduces 
fair behaviors but not fairness judgments. As there is no reason to believe that emotions 
are less involved in fairness judgments than in fair behaviors, a general reduction in 
emotional responsiveness should have also affected fairness judgments. Moreover, we 
had an additional treatment condition that we did not yet mention in this article. In our 
experiment, a responder not only played the usual ultimatum game for 10 rounds where 
the human partner proposes a division of the available money (human-offer condition), 
but every subject also played 10 rounds with human partners who could not make 
proposals themselves. A computer randomly generated the offers in these trials 
(computer-offer condition). The motive to punish the human partner for an unfair offer 
cannot play a role in the computer-offer condition, because the partner is not responsible 
for it. According to the theory of inequity aversion27, many subjects find accepting low 
offers per se aversive, even if made by a computer. Indeed, a considerable share (33%) of 
low offers were rejected in the computer-offer condition. A general reduction in 
emotional responsiveness by rTMS of the right DLPFC also should have affected 
behavior in the computer-offer condition significantly because there is no reason to 
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believe that an aversion against inequality is associated with less emotional involvement. 
We could not find such an effect, however; low-frequency rTMS of the right DLPFC did 
not increase the acceptance rate in the computer offer condition (P = 0.306). Finally, if 
rTMS simply reduces subjects’ emotional responsiveness, we should also expect an 
impact on subjects’ mood. We measured mood before and after rTMS using visual 
analogue scales and could not find any effect of rTMS on mood (see Figure 4). We 
therefore favor the hypothesis that the right DLPFC is causally involved in a neural 
network that controls or regulates the impact of the economic temptation on the 
acceptance decision. This interpretation can explain why rTMS affects fair behavior but 
not fairness judgments because no economic temptation is involved in fairness 
judgments, whereas the rejection of an unfair but positive offer requires foregoing 
economic gains. 
 
*** Insert Figure 4 about here *** 
 
As the right frontal lobe seems to be relevant for the integration of information42,43 
one might be tempted to suggest alternatively that right prefrontal rTMS causes an 
impairment in the ability to integrate different decision values – the positive monetary 
value of the gain and the negative value of unfairness. This hypothesis, however, cannot 
easily account for the fact that we observed treatment differences regarding the response 
times in accepting unfair offers, while there are no differences in response times when 
subjects face a fair offer. If integrating different decision values is more difficult after 
right rTMS of the DLPFC, subjects should exhibit longer response times in all situations. 
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However, rTMS of the right DLPFC did not affect response times when subjects faced 
fair offers, and the response time decreases strongly for subjects whose right prefrontal 
cortex was disrupted when they faced unfair offers of 4 in the human-offer condition.  
In conclusion, the findings in these studies suggest that cortical stimulation can 
modulate the fundamental human capacity of self-control, and the results thus confirm 
the asymmetric role of the prefrontal cortex in decision-making. They also indicate that 
the capacity for restraint depends on the activity level of the right prefrontal cortex. In 
response override, one must stop a pre-potent response to a stimulus, either because the 
response needs to be withheld or because a less pre-potent response is more appropriate. 
Without this capacity, we would be slaves of our emotional impulses, temptations, and 
desires and thus unable to behave socially adequately. Our findings also illustrate the 
importance of rTMS for further progress in understanding the neural basis of decision-
making. Although neuroimaging data indicate that responders’ left DLPFC is activated 
when they face unfair offers32, disruption of the left DLPFC does not change their 
behavior, suggesting that neuroimaging studies need to be complemented with techniques 
such as rTMS in order to reach more firm conclusions. Since our data suggest that the 
right lateral prefrontal cortex is causally involved in overriding self-interest, it would be 
interesting to investigate whether decreasing the activity level of right prefrontal cortex 
results in immoral decision-making, as moral decisions often require the inhibition of 
self-interest.  
Even though the application of TMS enables us to claim a causal role of lateral 
prefrontal cortex activity for self-control processes in the context of individual and social 
decision making, the exact neuronal mechanisms underlying the TMS-induced virtual 
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lesion will remain unknown until a simultaneous examination of underlying brain activity 
during task performance can be performed. Therefore, the combination of TMS-induced 
virtual lesions and fMRI during a given task promises important additional insights for 
studying the neural mechanisms of self-control.  
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Figure legends 
 
Figure 1 
This figure shows one exemplary trial as displayed on the computer screen. Subjects were 
presented with six boxes colored pink or blue. The number of pink and blue boxes varied 
from trial to trial according to a fixed pseudo-random sequence (sample shows “level of 
risk”: 5:1). Subjects were asked to find the winning token. They did not have to pick the 
individual box hiding the winning token, but simply had to select the color of the box it 
was hidden in (illustrated in the left panel by a schematic hand pointing to the pink box in 
this example). Subjects were told that each box, regardless of color, was equally likely to 
hide the winning token. Thus, the likelihood of finding the winning token was directly 
related to the ratio of blue to pink boxes. For a trial showing 5 blue boxes and 1 pink box, 
there would be a probability of 5/6 that the winning token was hidden in a blue box, but 
only a 1/6 chance that it was hidden in the single pink box. 
Importantly, subjects are rewarded or penalized depending on whether they pick the 
correct color box or not. There is a fixed reward associated with either choice of boxes’ 
color (“balance of reward”: 10 versus 90, 20 versus 80, 30 versus 70 and 40 versus 60). 
The larger reward (and penalty) is always associated with choice of the high risk prospect 
(i.e. the color with the fewer number of boxes), whereas the smallest reward (and 
penalty) is associated with choice of the low risk prospect. A correct choice results in the 
addition of the number of points associated with that particular scenario, while an 
incorrect choice results in the subtraction of the same amount (sample in the right panel 
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shows an incorrect choice which results in a subtraction of 90 points). Adapted from19 
(Copyright 2006 by the Society for Neuroscience). 
 
Figure 2A 
Percentage choice of the low risk prospect (means ± SEM) (A) for all three groups. (B) as 
a function of the balance of reward. Adapted from19 (Copyright 2006 by the Society for 
Neuroscience). 
 
 
Figure 3 
Behavioral responses and fairness judgments (means ± s.e.m.) related to the most unfair 
offer of CHF 4. (A) Acceptance rates across treatment groups. Subjects whose right 
DLPFC is disrupted exhibit a much higher acceptance rate than subjects in the other two 
treatments (Mann Whitney U tests, two-tailed, P < 0.05). (B) Perceived unfairness across 
treatments (1 = very unfair; 7 = very fair). Subjects in all three treatment groups perceive 
an offer of 4 as very unfair, and there are no significant differences across groups. 
Responders were shown a list of all feasible offers in the human and the computer offer 
condition and asked to report on a 7-point scale to what extent they perceived an offer as 
fair or unfair (1 = very unfair; 7 = very fair). As the ultimatum game experiment lasted 
only a short time, theses fairness assessments took place roughly 4-5 minutes after the 15 
minute offline stimulation with rTMS. Thus, when subjects assessed the fairness of 
different offers, their DLPFC was still disrupted if they had received real rTMS 
stimulation. Adapted from25. 
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Figure 4 
Subjects’ moods as indicated on a visual analogue scale. Subjects' moods are 
predominantly positive in all treatments. Neither before the application of rTMS 
(Kruskall-Wallis Test, P = 0.659) nor after the application (Kruskall-Wallis Test, P = 
0.773) did we observe mood differences across treatments. There are also no treatment 
differences in the change in mood (Kruskall-Wallis Test, P = 0.970). 
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